Inquiry into Southall Rail Accident Results in 93 Recommendations
Professor John Uff QC, the chairman of the inquiry, found that the primary cause of the accident was the failure of the driver of the high speed Great Western train to react to warning signals that he was approaching another train. The closing speed of the two trains at the point of collision was probably in excess of 80 mph. The crash resulted in the death of seven passengers and 139 people being injured, some severely.
The collision occurred on Sept. 19, 1997, at Southall East Junction between a London-bound high-speed passenger train (HST) operated by Great Western Trains (GWT) and an empty freight train operated by English, Welsh, and Scottish Railway (EWS).
The driver, Larry Harrison, and Great Western Trains, his employer, were charged in the accident. The criminal trial began on June 21, 1999. On June 30, a judge rejected the manslaughter charges against Great Western Trains and charges against Harrison were withdrawn. On July 2, 1999, Great Western Trains pleaded guilty to Health and Safety at Work Act charges and was fined GBP1.5 million.
Uff's report found that although there were no relevant faults on the track or signals, neither of the two main protection systems fitted to the high speed train—an automatic warning system (AWS) and an automatic train protection system (ATP)—were operational at the time of the accident. AWS would have alerted the driver to the warning signals. ATP would have prevented the train passing the red "stop" signal.
Uff's report makes the following recommendations:
- Driver training and procedures need to be improved and followed.
- AWS is to be regarded as vital to the continued running of a train and AWS and other train safety equipment should not fail due to preventable causes.
- Crashworthiness and safety procedures in passenger vehicles should be reviewed.
- Safety briefings for passengers, much like those used on airlines, should be adopted on a trial basis.
- Inter-company rights and obligations in equipment added to rail vehicles must be defined.
- System authorities should be created to oversee safety projects including AWS and ATP.
Uff recommended that ATP should be maintained on Great Western lines and an extension to the present coverage of ATP on Great Western lines should be considered. He suggested that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) direct technical accident investigations. He also suggested that the Rail Industry Inquiry Procedures should be reviewed to ensure that all necessary rail safety issues are subject to rapid action.
In addition to considering the causes of the accident, the Southall Report deals with wider safety issues, including crashworthiness of passenger vehicles and safety systems.
Uff made note of the fact that the public inquiry, which was set up within days of the Southall accident, was delayed for two years because of the criminal prosecutions. An internal inquiry carried out under the Rail Industry Procedures did not have access to many technical reports because of the ongoing criminal action.
"I regard this as unsatisfactory," said Uff, "and my report contains recommendations aimed at improving the inquiry process."
Uff also complained that the technical investigation of the crash, which was under the control of British Transport Police, "had a number of shortcomings and I have made recommendations about crash investigation procedures."
He said he hopes the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) will move forward on his recommendations.
Copies of the Southall Rail Accident Inquiry Report, ISBN 0-7176-1757-2, price GBP19.50, are available from HSE Books, P.O. Box 1999, Sudbury, Suffolk, CO10 6FS.
By Sandy Smith